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Abstract 43 
In 2009, London Overground management implemented a new tactical plan for AM and PM 44 
Peak service on the North London Line (NLL). This paper documents that tactical planning 45 
intervention and evaluates its outcome in terms of certain aspects of service delivery (the 46 
operator’s perspective on system performance) and service quality (passenger’s perspective). 47 
Analyses of service delivery and quality, and passenger demand contribute to the development, 48 
proposal, and implementation of the new tactical plan. It is found that NLL trains were routinely 49 
delayed en route and excessive dwell time is major cause. Near-random passenger incidence 50 
behavior suggests an even headway service may be more appropriate for NLL. The confluence 51 
of these analyses is confirmed by the corresponding excess journey time (EJT) results. Based on 52 
longitudinal analysis, evaluation shows that on-time performance increased substantially and 53 
observed journey time (OJT) decreased with the introduction of the new plan. EJT decreases by 54 
substantially more than OJT for the line as a whole. Overall, the effects of this implementation 55 
appear to have been positive on balance. This case study thus demonstrates the applicability of 56 
automatic data generally, and certain measures and techniques in London Overground 57 
specifically, to support tactical planning of an urban railway. 58 
  59 
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1. INTRODUCTION 60 
The London Overground network is for the most part circumferential, primarily orbiting 61 
London to the North and West, and is very much part of the integrated network of Transport for 62 
London (TfL) and National Rail services. Since the Oyster system, TfL’s automatic fare 63 
collection (AFC) smartcard system, controls entry to and exit from the public transport network, 64 
the individual passenger journey data it collects can potentially provide useful assistance for 65 
tactical planning for the London Overground. 66 
Tactical planning for the Overground is a shared responsibility between TfL and London 67 
Overground Rail Operations Limited (LOROL), the contract operator of the London Overground. 68 
From 2008 to 2009, London Overground management researched, designed, and implemented a 69 
new tactical plan for AM and PM Peak service on the North London Line. This paper documents 70 
that tactical planning intervention and evaluates its outcome in terms of certain aspects of service 71 
delivery (the operator’s perspective on system performance) and service quality (passenger’s 72 
perspective). 73 
Frumin (1) proposes various methods based on smartcard data for origin-destination (OD) 74 
matrix estimation, passenger incidence behavior analysis, and service quality measurement. The 75 
goal of this paper is to illustrate automatic data and these methods can be used to contribute to 76 
real-world tactical planning processes considering a range of decision factors and variables. It is 77 
presented as a case study in that most of the work it describes was conducted by other analysts 78 
and professionals. It depends heavily on in-person and e-mail interviews with key Overground 79 
managers and on research conducted for those managers by an industry consultant. It is 80 
descriptive in nature, rather than prescriptive. 81 
Section 2 describes some aspects of the service plan, passenger demand, and operating 82 
performance on the North London Line at the time of the tactical planning exercise. Section 3 83 
describes how understanding of and relationships between these factors was synthesized to guide 84 
the development of a revised tactical plan. Section 4 evaluates the outcomes of the 85 
implementation of this plan using longitudinal before-and-after analysis. Section 5 draws some 86 
conclusions regarding this evaluation, including its use of service delivery and service quality 87 
measurements. 88 
 89 
2. THE NORTH LONDON LINE: SPRING 2008 90 
This section describes some relevant information about the North London Line as of the 91 
Spring of 2008, first in terms of the existing service plan, next in terms of passenger demand, and 92 
last in terms of operating performance as expressed by different measures of service delivery and 93 
service quality. 94 
 95 
2.1 The Service Plan 96 
The North London Line (NLL) is the backbone of the London Overground network. It 97 
serves 23 stations running 28 kilometers circumferentially around central London from Stratford 98 
in the northeast to Richmond in the southwest. It connects to the Gospel Oak to Barking Line 99 
(GOB) at Gospel Oak station (GPO) and to the Watford DC Line (WAT) and West London Line 100 
(WLL) at Willesden Junction station (WIJ).  It is by far the busiest Overground line, with the 101 
most frequent service and an estimated 58% of all Overground boardings (2). The NLL runs four 102 
(end-to-end) trains per hour (tph) over most of the day, with some segments receiving six tph 103 
during the peak periods. Figure 1 schematically illustrates the AM Peak (07:00 – 10:00) service 104 
patterns and frequencies on the NLL (and other Overground lines) in Spring 2008. 105 
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 107 
FIGURE 1 London Overground Spring 2008 AM Peak service patterns and frequencies 108 
 109 
Figure 2 uses a time-distance plot to show the published AM Peak timetable for the NLL 110 
in Spring 2008. This plot shows a regular 15 minute headway (4tph) service making all stops 111 
westbound from Stratford to Richmond and eastbound from Richmond to Stratford. This regular 112 
service is augmented by occasional irregular additional services that split some of the 15 minute 113 
headways into two smaller headways. These irregular services include 114 
• “Camden shuttles” that run approximately hourly between Stratford (SRA) and 115 
Camden Road (CMD) (departing Stratford at 07:59 and 09:31); 116 
• “Clapham specials” that run approximately hourly between Stratford and Clapham 117 
Junction (CLJ), diverting from the NLL to the WLL (not shown in plot) at Willesden 118 
Junction (departing Stratford at 07:11 and 08:30); 119 
• one full NLL service from Stratford to Richmond (RMD) at 09:02. 120 
This timetable was developed before TfL and LOROL controlled the Overground 121 
network, when it was a standard National Rail concession operated by the Silverlink TOC. David 122 
Warner (3), a planner in TfL London Rail, noted that the Camden shuttles were added in 2004, 123 
and the Clapham specials in 2006. Oliver Bratton (4), Head of Performance and Planning for 124 
LOROL, noted that “TfL was getting concerned about the overcrowding on the NLL. It therefore 125 
agreed to ‘buy’ additional services from Silverlink for the peaks.” To add the additional trips, 126 
Silverlink planners “put them into the existing schedule ... amongst the 15 minute service when 127 
appropriate.” 128 
Describing the origins of this timetable, Warner (3) noted that “the service was entirely 129 
driven by the rolling stock available, and the incremental nature in which additional trains were 130 
added to the timetable. An overall view was not taken.” Bratton (4) discussed the timetable 131 
development process for the National Rail network more generally, noting that “typically, a 132 
timetable evolves. As more and more trains run, the timetable tends to ossify, becoming harder 133 
and harder to alter.” It appears from these comments that the highly irregular NLL peak period 134 
timetable was in place largely as a historical artifact. It was not the product of an analytical or 135 
data-driven tactical planning process. 136 
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FIGURE 2 North London Line Spring 2008 AM Peak timetable 138 
 139 
2.2 Passenger Demand 140 
2.2.1 NLL AM Peak Origin-Destination Matrix 141 
Passenger demand for a public transport network can be expressed as a matrix of 142 
passenger origin-destination (OD) flows (an OD matrix). A methodology is developed to 143 
estimate OD matrices for railway networks from multiple automatic data sources, including 144 
passenger journey data from the Oyster smartcard ticketing system, automatic entrance counts 145 
from selected station gatelines, and on-board passenger loads estimated from loadweigh data (1). 146 
By applying this method to the London Overground network, a segment-level AM Peak OD 147 
matrix for the NLL is estimated and shown in Table 1. This matrix includes journeys that 148 
interchange with the NLL, but it “clamps” those journeys to the point at which they would make 149 
that interchange. 150 
 151 
TABLE 1 Segment Level NLL AM Peak Origin-Destination Matrix 152 
Origin 
Segment 
Destination Segment Total NLLE GPO* NLLC WIJ* NLLW 
NLLE 9,390 369 1,848 392 517 12,435 
GPO* 158  356 94 145 753 
NLLC 1,362 268 778 596 1,019 4,023 
WIJ* 524 83 465  808 1,880 
NLLW 687 63 678 359 1,234 3,021 
Total 12,040 783 4,125 1,441 3,723 22,112 
Cells highlighted in grey depend only on NLL service West of Willesden Junction 153 
* Includes flows interchanging between NLL and other Overground lines at these interchanged stations. 154 
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 155 
It is estimated that a total of 37,124 passengers use the London Overground on an 156 
average weekday AM Peak period. The NLL OD matrix in Table 1 shows that 22,112, or 60%, 157 
of all AM Peak Overground passengers use the NLL for some portion of their journey. The cells 158 
of Table 1 highlighted in grey indicate passenger flows which use the NLL only between 159 
Willesden Junction and Richmond (RMD), inclusive. They total 5,510 AM Peak passengers, or 160 
25% of total NLL AM Peak patronage. In other words, 75% of all AM Peak NLL passengers use 161 
the NLL only between Stratford and Willesden Junction, inclusive. 162 
 163 
2.2.2 Aggregate Load Profiles (NLL AM Peak) 164 
Figure 3 plots the aggregate load profile for the NLL. The most salient observation to be 165 
drawn from these plots is that by far the largest aggregate link loads on the NLL during the AM 166 
Peak are westbound between Stratford and Highbury & Islington (HHY). The aggregate load 167 
starts at over 4,000 total passengers out of Stratford and grows at each successive station, 168 
peaking at close to 6,000 total passengers between Canonbury (CNN) and Highbury & Islington. 169 
 170 
 171 
FIGURE 3 NLL AM Peak load profile 172 
 173 
2.2.3 Passenger Incidence Behavior 174 
Passenger incidence behavior refers to the act or event of being incident to a public 175 
service with intent to use that service. Frumin and Zhao (5) proposed a method to estimate 176 
incidence headway and waiting time by integrating disaggregate smartcard data with published 177 
time tables using schedule-based assignment and applied it to stations in the entire London 178 
Overground to demonstrate its practicality. The method was implemented in the free/open source 179 
software library Graphserver (6), which reads timetables in the widely used General Transit Feed 180 
Specification (GIFS) (7). In result, it is found that the temporal distribution of passenger demand 181 
on the North London Line was much less timetable-dependent than on the other London 182 
Overground lines. That is, passenger incidence behavior was more random on the NLL and less a 183 
function of the timetable. Figure 4 illustrates the difference of passenger incidence behavior 184 
between the NLL and the GOB in terms of the respective distributions of passenger incidence 185 
times (over a given headway) in the AM Peak. 186 
The implications of these distributions in terms of their effects on passenger waiting time 187 
(with respect to the timetable) are also quantified. It found that the dependence on the timetable 188 
M. Frumin, J. Zhao, N. Wilson, and Z. Zhao  6 
observed on the GOB in the AM Peak reduced waiting time by 29% compared with purely 189 
random passenger incidence. On the NLL the comparable reduction was only 7.2%. 190 
 191 
 192 
FIGURE 4 AM Peak passenger incidence on NLL and GOB 193 
 194 
2.3 Operating Performance: Service Delivery and Quality 195 
 196 
2.3.1 Public Performance Measure (PPM) 197 
On-time performance (OTP), the fraction of services with schedule deviation within some 198 
threshold (8), is a widely used measure to characterize service delivery. Under the name of 199 
Public Performance Measure (PPM), this is the current measure of performance on the London 200 
Overground and all other National Rail services in the UK, with a train considered “on time" if it 201 
is less than 5 minutes late at the destination terminal (9). PPM is analyzed for the 52 weekdays 202 
from 31 March, 2008 through 10 June, 2008, inclusive. PPM for the NLL over this range of 203 
dates was 83% for the AM Peak period and 89% for the whole weekday. This was the worst of 204 
all of the Overground lines. 205 
 206 
2.3.2 Running and Dwell Times 207 
ACT, A British railway consultancy, was retained by LOROL to study operations on the 208 
NLL (10). They used automatic train movement data from the network's signaling and control 209 
system to analyze running and dwell times from April, 2007 through March, 2008, inclusive. As 210 
TfL and LOROL took control of the Overground network in November of 2007, this study 211 
included a period of substantial institutional and branding change on the NLL.  212 
• Over the course of the study period, increases in terminal-to-terminal running times 213 
were observed in the AM and PM Peak periods in both directions.  214 
• For both directions in the peak periods, the 80th percentile running time is between the 215 
running time in the timetable and the PPM threshold (i.e. timetable plus five minutes); 216 
the 90th percentile running time is above the PPM threshold. 217 
• At the 80th and 90th percentiles, the peak period running time westbound (i.e. from 218 
Stratford) exceeds the peak period eastbound running time by just over two minutes. 219 
• Dwell times increased (by an unspecified amount) over the course of the study period, 220 
especially during the peak periods. 221 
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• As measured during only the first quarter (i.e. January through March) of 2008, there 222 
was substantial “dwell time loss” - station dwell times in excess of those specified in 223 
the working timetables. Nine out of the top ten westbound (i.e. from Stratford) 224 
scheduled services in terms of average dwell time loss were in the AM Peak period. 225 
Likewise, nine out of the top ten eastbound (i.e. from Richmond) scheduled services 226 
in terms of average dwell time loss were in the PM Peak period. 227 
• A statistical correlation was found, for individual station stops by individual 228 
scheduled services, between the length of the leading headway and the station dwell 229 
time. 230 
From these observations, the consultants drew two important conclusions regarding 231 
service delivery on the NLL. Firstly, that running times in the timetable are insufficient, 232 
particularly for the AM and PM Peak periods. Secondly, that dwell times, and corresponding 233 
dwell time losses, were driven by passenger demand. The consultants provided only this analysis 234 
of current conditions and their conclusions as to what may have been causing those conditions. 235 
They did not offer any explicit recommendations on what actions should be taken to improve 236 
those conditions. 237 
 238 
2.3.3 Train Congestion 239 
Two types of train congestion were also observed on the London Overground network - 240 
that between Overground trains, and that between Overground trains and freight trains on the 241 
NLL. Bratton (4)  noted that “turning trains at Camden was causing congestion on the network” 242 
between Overground services. This congestion has not been studied or quantified directly, only 243 
reported anecdotally by Overground management and operational staff. However, based on 244 
examination of the timetable in Figure 2, it is not hard to believe that such congestion was 245 
occurring. The two Camden shuttles that depart Stratford at 07:59 and at 09:31 both arrive at 246 
Camden Road within a few minutes of an eastbound train from Richmond. Under these 247 
circumstances, even slight deviations from schedule could cause congestion and delays to the 248 
trains from Richmond, to the Camden shuttle on its return trip to Stratford, and to the subsequent 249 
westbound train from Stratford. 250 
It is of course also possible that the NLL suffered from additional types and instances of 251 
train congestion, especially at other junctions and at terminals. Congestion between Overground 252 
trains at Camden Road and other locations could have been identified and studied in further 253 
detail through the use of time-distance plots (11, 12, 13, 14). Such plots can be generated from 254 
automatic train movement data recorded by the Overground network's signaling and control 255 
systems (that were used to study running and dwell times), rather than from timetables as in 256 
Figure 2. 257 
 258 
2.3.4 Excess Journey Time 259 
Wilson et al. first proposed a measure called “excess waiting time” (EWT) to indicate the 260 
waiting time experienced by passengers beyond what they would have waited had all headways 261 
been exactly as scheduled (15). London Transport then extend the EWT concept to the entirety 262 
of journeys, using “excess journey time” (EJT) to represent the difference between actual 263 
passenger journey times and journey times implied by the published timetable (16). Using a 264 
unified estimator of EJT developed by Zhao et al. (17), which is unbiased at the aggregate level 265 
regardless of the passenger incidence behavior (random incidence, scheduled incidence, or a 266 
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mixture of both), EJT for the NLL as of the Spring of 2008 was examined in detail. The relevant 267 
results can be summarized as follows. 268 
• The NLL in the AM Peak had by far the most total EJT of any Overground line in any 269 
time period, followed by the NLL in the PM Peak. 270 
• In terms of mean EJT (i.e. after normalizing by number of passengers) the AM Peak 271 
was the worst time period for the NLL. 272 
• In terms of total and mean EJT, the NLL in the AM Peak had over twice the EJT in 273 
the westbound direction (i.e. Stratford to Richmond) as in the eastbound direction. 274 
• Total EJT was severely unbalanced among individual westbound AM Peak scheduled 275 
services on the NLL. The five scheduled services with the highest total EJT were, in 276 
descending order, the 08:22, 07:52, 07:07, 08:52, and 07:37 trains from Stratford. 277 
These services had full 15 minute headways (at Stratford) and had substantially more 278 
total EJT than their respective shorter-headway leaders and/or followers. 279 
• Mean EJT on the NLL was somewhat linearly correlated with PPM. However, the 280 
relationship was weaker in the AM Peak than for the whole day, and in the AM Peak 281 
for lower PPM values. 282 
 283 
3. TACTICAL PLANNING INTERVENTION: THE CASE FOR EVEN 284 
INTERVALS 285 
This section synthesizes the results of the previous section to explain the thinking behind 286 
a specific tactical planning intervention that was implemented on the NLL. It does so primarily 287 
from the perspective of the London Overground manager who was the driving force behind this 288 
change. This manager was influenced by the results of some of the early research from Frumin 289 
(1), and used some of these results to make the case to his stakeholders.  290 
Certain factors in the decision to implement this change, such as complete costs and 291 
benefits, were not available for this case study. In addition, the manager's perspective is 292 
supplemented here by analysis drawn from the final results of this paper. In that sense, the case 293 
this section makes for the tactical planning change is not precisely the case that was made in 294 
practice. Nevertheless, it provides a context in which to illustrate the value of the methods used 295 
in this paper for using automatic data to support the tactical planning of an urban railway. 296 
Of the results and analyses discussed in the previous sections of this paper, the key points 297 
that influenced the tactical planning intervention on the NLL are as follows. They are focused on 298 
the AM Peak period, in which, as of Spring 2008, the trains were routinely delayed en route, as 299 
reflected by running times substantially in excess of the timetable and by low PPM on-time 300 
performance scores. Excessive dwell times were found to be a major cause of en route train 301 
delays. Evidence existed to support the judgment that these dwell times were primarily a 302 
function of passenger volumes. Near-random passenger incidence behavior suggested an 303 
explanation for uneven passenger volumes and resultant uneven dwell times - when passengers 304 
arrive (even approximately) randomly, services with longer headways will serve proportionally 305 
more passengers. The confluence of these analyses is confirmed by the corresponding EJT 306 
results.  307 
As described in Section 2.1, the typical approach to tactical planning on this network was 308 
to update the timetable incrementally. It became evident that more drastic measures were needed 309 
in this case. Specifically, that the timetable should be revised wholesale to provide as even 310 
headways as possible. Under the circumstances, it was proposed to achieve this by combining the 311 
NLL and WLL during the AM and PM Peak periods into an even 10 minute headway (6tph) 312 
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service between Stratford and Willesden Junction. From Willesden, alternating trains would go 313 
on the NLL to Richmond and the WLL to Clapham Junction. This was referred to as the “3 + 3” 314 
service. 315 
The core idea behind this strategy was to balance passenger volumes across trains, thus 316 
reducing dwell times and train and passenger delays. It was expected that passenger volumes 317 
would increase on some trains (i.e. those with longer headways than in the current plan) and 318 
decrease on others (i.e. those with shorter headways). While the change was not expected to 319 
materially affect the total volume of passengers, the outcome was expected to be positive on 320 
balance. The reasons for this are twofold.  321 
Firstly, dwell times have been found to have a non-linear relationship to passenger 322 
volumes (18, 19). This implies that, holding the total volume of passengers constant, the 323 
decreases in dwell times on trains losing passengers (i.e. the existing 15 minute headway services) 324 
would be larger than the increases in dwell times on trains gaining passengers (i.e. the shorter 325 
headway services). Consequently, overall delays should decrease. Secondly, consistent with the 326 
hypothesis of unbalanced on-train loads, it was anecdotally reported that some passengers were 327 
unable to board overcrowded trains, and were be left behind on the platform. The most crowded 328 
trains (with larger headways) would be less crowded and allow more (or all) passengers to board. 329 
Passengers currently denied boarding by overcrowded trains would thus benefit substantially 330 
while other passengers would benefit (from less crowded trains) or suffer (on more crowded 331 
trains) to a lesser degree.  332 
 333 
3.1 “3+3” Service on the North London Line 334 
3.1.1 Headway Adjustment and Frequency Reallocation 335 
The new tactical plan resulting from the above analysis was referred to as the “3 + 3” 336 
service because it integrated the NLL and WLL into a single trunk-and-branch service for the 337 
AM and PM Peak periods. It is effectively an even 20 minute headway (3tph) service between 338 
Stratford and Richmond superimposed with an identically spaced service between Stratford and 339 
Clapham Junction. The two services are offset by 10 minutes, yielding an even 10 minute 340 
headway (6tph) trunk service between Stratford and Willesden Junction. 341 
Figure 4 uses a time-distance plot to show the corresponding published AM Peak 342 
timetable for the NLL. Table 2 summarizes the changes in the evenness and frequency of service 343 
for each segment of the NLL and WLL. 344 
 345 
TABLE 2 NLL and WLL Service under the Spring 2008 and the “3 + 3” Tactical Plans 346 
 347 
 348 
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The only part of the WLL and NLL to lose any service frequency under this reallocation 349 
was the western end of the NLL between Willesden Junction and Richmond. One additional 350 
shuttle trip over this segment was added for the entire peak period, but overall the headway 351 
increased from 15 minutes to 20 minutes (4tph to 3tph). Not surprisingly, this was the most 352 
contentious aspect of this plan. However, the OD matrix estimated in Section 2.2 shows that only 353 
25% of the NLL passengers using the NLL in the AM Peak used this segment of the line. The “3 354 
+ 3” tactical plan thus reallocated service such that more passengers gained service than lost it. 355 
In doing this, it was able to establish a service pattern with even headways throughout the 356 
network that was easier for customers and operators to understand, remember, and use. 357 
 358 
3.1.2 Running Time Adjustment 359 
In addition to the headway and frequency changes, timetable running times were also 360 
adjusted. Bratton (4) described conventional practice in National Rail timetable development 361 
being to add running time between the penultimate and final stations on a line. This increases 362 
PPM scores (i.e. on-time performance) and increases the chance that a train will be in place for 363 
the beginning of its next trip, but has little effect on the fidelity of the timetable to actual 364 
operating conditions on most of the line. 365 
In the new timetable, the running time between Stratford and Camden Road was 366 
shortened by 1-2 minutes on the basis that evening the headways would drastically reduce dwell 367 
times. The running time between Camden Road and Richmond was lengthened by 3-4 minutes to 368 
account for discrepancies found in the study by ACT (10). Both changes were effected through 1 369 
minute adjustments en-route rather than in large blocks of time at the end of the line or segment 370 
of the line. The total running time between Stratford and Richmond was lengthened by 371 
approximately 3 minutes on average over the AM Peak period. 372 
 373 
 374 
FIGURE 5 North London Line “3+3” timetable 375 
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 376 
3.1.3 Costs 377 
Bratton (20) noted that the changes in service described here were for all intents and 378 
purposes cost-neutral. The reallocation of service frequencies and adjustments in running times 379 
were such that the “3 + 3” service could be operated at approximately the same costs as the 380 
existing timetable. No new rolling stock was required and only two additional crew members - 381 
conductors at an annual salary of $23 thousand each - were needed to fully staff the new 382 
timetable. 383 
 384 
4. EVALUATION 385 
“3 + 3” service went into effect on the NLL and WLL on Monday, 20 April, 2009. This 386 
section evaluates the outcomes of this tactical planning intervention, primarily through 387 
longitudinal analysis of measures of service delivery and service quality. These measures are 388 
taken for a period directly after the implementation, and compared to two periods before the 389 
implementation - one directly before and one a year earlier. The goal of this evaluation is to 390 
assess, to the degree possible, the causal effects on passengers and on the operation of changing 391 
the tactical plan. However, despite the large amount of data available, any number of 392 
uncontrolled factors may confound this analysis.  393 
Because this evaluation is of a major change to the timetable, it is important to evaluate 394 
service quality in absolute as well as relative terms. Consequently, total observed journey time 395 
(OJT) is analyzed along with EJT. All else being equal, any change in OJT should be reflected in 396 
an equal change in EJT. However, any adjustment to the timetable will break this link. 397 
Service delivery is evaluated primarily in terms of PPM and dwell times, the latter of 398 
which was analyzed in a follow-up study by ACT (21). Interviews with London Overground 399 
management are also considered. 400 
This evaluation is focused on the NLL, and uses the GOB as a control since there were no 401 
substantial changes to the GOB timetable over this period. The GOB is not a perfect control in 402 
that it has different service and demand characteristics from the NLL, but it should be subject to 403 
similar universal influences such as weather, overall economic conditions, etc. The NLL is 404 
evaluated as a whole (including passengers in both directions) and also for the core market 405 
passengers traveling between Stratford and Camden Road in the westbound direction (i.e. 406 
towards Camden Road). This “NLL Core” market is analyzed separately because it is the only 407 
section of the line for which there was only a change in the evenness of headways in the peak 408 
hours and not a change in the overall frequency of service. 409 
 410 
4.1 Evaluation Data 411 
The following three study periods are analyzed to evaluate the effects of introducing “3 + 412 
3” service. They are determined in part by data availability. 413 
After2009: Weekdays from 20 April through 15 May and 1 June through 5 June, 2009, 414 
inclusive. This is 5 out of the first 7 weeks directly following the introduction of “3 + 3” service. 415 
Before2009: Weekdays from 2 March through 13 March, 2009. This is a period of two 416 
weeks shortly before the introduction of “3 + 3” service. 417 
Spring2008: Weekdays from 21 April through 16 May and 2 June through 6 June, 2008, 418 
inclusive. These are the weeks in 2008 corresponding to the weeks in the After2009 period. 419 
Complete PPM and timetable data were available for these study periods. Observed and 420 
excess journey times (i.e. OJT and EJT) are measured from Oyster journey data. At first glance 421 
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the numbers in this table indicate increasing weekly ridership. However, this interpretation does 422 
not account for changes in the Oyster penetration rate among Overground riders. An increasing 423 
penetration rate would result in increasing volumes of Oyster data despite static volumes of 424 
overall ridership. This evaluation does not explicitly analyze total ridership on the Overground 425 
network or lines in question. 426 
Line and segment running time analysis is drawn from the report by ACT (21). 427 
Unfortunately, ACT reported on changes in median rather than mean dwell times. Median values 428 
mask the effects of large outliers, which for a nonlinear phenomena such as dwell time are 429 
expected to be quite important, so changes in dwell time are not directly analyzed here. 430 
 431 
4.2 Evaluation Results 432 
Table 3 shows PPM, EJT, and OJT results for the three network segments for the three 433 
study periods. It shows the difference from Spring2008 to Before2009 to indicate the changes in 434 
performance between the time the tactical planning analysis was done and just before “3 + 3” 435 
was implemented. It shows the difference from Before2009 to After2009 with the hope of 436 
isolating the effects of introducing the “3 + 3” service. 437 
The differences in EJT and OJT were tested in a single-sided difference of means t-test. 438 
All differences on the NLL and NLL Core were statistically significant at the 1% level. 439 
Differences on the GOB between After2009 and Spring2008 were significant at the 5% level, but 440 
between intermediate periods were not significant even at the 10% level. 441 
On the GOB, the changes in all three measures were small - PPM fluctuated by 0.8% and 442 
returned to its original value of 95.5%, while EJT and OJT decreased by 0.08 minutes (6.3%) 443 
and 0.18 minutes (0.7%), respectively, between the initial and final study period. It is not 444 
unexpected that OJT and EJT did not vary by the exact same amount. While the changes to the 445 
GOB timetable were minor, OJT could be affected by slight shifts in (i) passenger incidence 446 
behavior, since EJT is calculated against scheduled waiting time; or (ii) the temporal distribution 447 
of ridership over the AM Peak, since running times in the timetable do vary slightly over the AM 448 
Peak. This illustrates some of the factors that may confound the longitudinal analysis for the 449 
NLL, if only to a small degree. 450 
 451 
TABLE 3 PPM and Passenger Journey Time Results and Comparisons for “3 + 3” 452 
Implementation 453 
Study Period GOB NLL NLL Core PPM (%) EJT OJT PPM (%) EJT OJT EJT OJT 
Spring2008 95.5 1.27 25.32 85.9 2.77 26.50 2.33 17.97 
Before2009 96.3 1.21 25.25 79.7 2.29 25.69 1.39 17.42 
After2009 95.5 1.19 25.14 92.4 1.68 25.51 1.75 17.06 
Bef09 - Spr08 0.8 -0.06 -0.07 -6.2 -0.48 -0.81 -0.94 -0.55 
Aft09 - Bef09 -0.8 -0.02 -0.11 12.7 -0.61 -0.18 0.36 -0.36 
Aft09 - Spr08 0.0 -0.08 -0.18 6.6 -1.09 -0.99 -0.57 -0.91 
 454 
On the NLL as a whole, changes may be observed in all the calculated measures. PPM 455 
decreased (i.e. worsened) between the Spring2008 and Before2009 study periods by nearly 6 456 
percentage points. ACT (21) found that over this time average train journey time from Stratford 457 
to Richmond increased by about 30 seconds. 458 
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OJT and EJT decreased (i.e. improved), by 0.81 minutes (3.1%) and 0.48 minutes 459 
(17.3%), respectively, over the 9 months between the first two study periods. For the NLL Core 460 
passengers, OJT and EJT decreased by 0.55 minutes (3.1%) and 0.94 minutes (40.3%), 461 
respectively. It is interesting to note in these cases that the changes in EJT and OJT, measures of 462 
relative and absolute service quality, were directionally opposite of the changes in PPM, a 463 
measure of service delivery. 464 
It appears that there were substantial improvements to absolute and relative service 465 
quality on the NLL as experienced by passengers before the implementation of the “3 + 3” 466 
service. Bratton (20) attributes this primarily to “higher performing Network Rail infrastructure.” 467 
The 2008 TfL Investment Programme (22) indicates that $56.9 million of infrastructure upgrades 468 
were planned during this period. Much of this investment was in support of capacity on the NLL 469 
to an eventual 12tph. It is difficult to separate these capacity upgrades from investments that 470 
would improve infrastructure performance at the same level of throughput, but this figure 471 
indicates the intensity of the work that was done. 472 
For the NLL, the comparison between the Before2009 and After2009 study periods 473 
should give the clearest insight into the direct effects of introducing the “3 + 3” service. PPM 474 
increased by over 12 percentage points while the average running time from Stratford to 475 
Richmond increased by just under 20 seconds. Unfortunately, ACT (21) did not report on the 476 
distributions of running times, so it is impossible to say how much the change in PPM is a result 477 
of improved service delivery as compared to the more generous standard set by lengthening the 478 
running time in the timetable. During this period, the average train running time from Stratford 479 
to Camden Road decreased by 50 seconds. 480 
OJT decreased by an additional 0.18 minutes (0.7%) for the NLL as a whole and 0.36 481 
minutes (2.1%) for the NLL Core, indicating improved passenger journey times. The changes in 482 
EJT, like those in PPM, are more difficult to interpret. For the NLL Core, EJT worsened (i.e. 483 
increased away from zero) while PPM and OJT both improved. This is not a surprise, as the 484 
running time between Stratford and Camden Road was shortened in the new timetable. OJT 485 
decreased but the scheduled journey times (SJT) decreased even more, so EJT increased. This 486 
illustrates one of the disadvantages of timetable-based measures of service quality such as EJT. 487 
Given the substantial changes to the timetable, the effects of introducing “3 + 3” service 488 
may best be judged in terms of absolute service quality. The decreases in OJT suggest that the 489 
tactical planning intervention improved the experience of NLL passengers. The changes in OJT 490 
are 22.2% and 65.4% of the changes observed on the NLL and NLL Core, respectively, between 491 
the Spring2008 and Before2009 study periods. 492 
Figure 6 plots total EJT by scheduled service for westbound passenger journeys on the 493 
NLL between Stratford and Willesden Junction in the Spring2008 period and the After2009 494 
period. A comparison between the two shows a more even distribution of EJT across scheduled 495 
services during the height of the peak period. For example, in After2009 the differences between 496 
the services with the highest total EJT (the 08:09 and 08:39 trains from Stratford) and their 497 
respective leaders and followers is smaller, even in relative terms, than the same differences for 498 
the services with the highest EJT in Spring2008 (the 07:52 and 08:22 trains from Stratford). 499 
Because the timetable and headways changed between these two study periods, incidence 500 
behavior was also examined, but no noticeable change in overall incidence behavior is found. 501 
Mean scheduled waiting time (which is part of the scheduled journey time against which EJT is 502 
measured) decreased by 0.1 minutes on the NLL Core and increased by approximately the same 503 
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amount over the entire NLL. These changes appear to be a function primarily of the changes to 504 
the timetable rather than changes in incidence behavior. 505 
Abdul Salique (23), a TfL contract manager who represents TfL in its relationship with 506 
LOROL, was interviewed about the effects of introducing the “3 + 3” service. It should be noted 507 
that it is his job to hold LOROL to their contractual responsibilities while considering the 508 
experience of the Overground's passengers to whom TfL is ultimately accountable. He noted that 509 
“overall it is good for passengers... There has been a lot of good passenger benefit to a greater 510 
number of passengers than those that have been disadvantaged”. “It has also improved train 511 
performance and has made the timetable more robust and easier to recover from... Overall I 512 




(a) Spring2008 517 
 518 
 519 
(b) After2009 520 
FIGURE 6 Total EJT by scheduled service, westbound, after “3+3” implementation 521  522 
5. CONCLUSIONS 523 
The case study presented in this paper, provided a rich example of the use of automatic 524 
data to support tactical planning on the North London Line (NLL) of the Overground network. 525 
The analyses of this paper contributed to both the development of the new tactical plan for the 526 
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NLL and to the evaluation of the implementation of that plan. The effects of this implementation 527 
appear to have been positive on balance. This case study thus demonstrates the applicability of 528 
automatic data generally, and the data and methods used in London Overground specifically, for 529 
tactical planning of an urban railway. 530 
Various measures of service delivery and service quality, all generated from automatic 531 
data sources, contributed to the tactical planning exercise that led to the “3 + 3” service. In terms 532 
of service delivery, dwell times, running times, and on-time performance were analyzed using 533 
train signaling and control data. They indicated that running times in operation were substantially 534 
longer than in the timetable, and that excess dwell time, particularly on certain scheduled 535 
services and at certain locations, was one of the main causes of increased running times. Service 536 
quality was analyzed primarily in a relative sense in terms of EJT as measured using Oyster 537 
journey data and the published timetable. EJT was found to add an element of the passenger's 538 
perspective to the tactical planning process. It can focus tactical planning attention to the 539 
segments of passengers who need it most, and can support and enhance analyses that have been 540 
initiated from the operator's perspective. 541 
Two analyses of passenger demand also contributed to the tactical planning process. 542 
Passenger incidence behavior on the NLL was analyzed using Oyster journey data and the 543 
published timetable. It was found to be substantially more random than previously assumed, 544 
contributing to the decision to move the NLL to an even headway service.  Also analyzed was 545 
the origin-destination matrix of overall AM Peak passenger demand on the Overground network, 546 
estimated from aggregate Oyster passenger volumes, automatic gateline entry counts, and 547 
manual on-board passenger counts. This OD matrix indicated that the proposed reallocation of 548 
some service frequency away from the western end of the NLL towards the eastern end would 549 
benefit more passengers than it would harm.  550 
The confluence of these analyses contributed to the development, proposal, and 551 
implementation of the even headway “3 + 3” service on the NLL and West London Line (WLL) 552 
in the AM and PM peak periods. The development of the timetable for this service was also 553 
influenced by the key concept inherent in the idea of measuring EJT - that standards can be set 554 
and lateness can be measured at the level of individual passenger journeys or OD flows. This led 555 
the developers of the timetable to adjust running times throughout the length of the NLL rather 556 
than only at the end of the line as was typical on the National Rail network. In this sense, EJT 557 
can be a useful tool to help shift tactical planning practices which may be less oriented towards 558 
the passenger's perspective than is desired. 559 
Service delivery and quality on the NLL were analyzed longitudinally to evaluate the 560 
effects of introducing the “3 + 3” service on passengers and on the operation. Because the 561 
timetable changed so drastically in the “3 + 3” implementation, an additional measure of 562 
absolute service quality was included in the evaluation. Observed journey time (OJT) was 563 
estimated using only Oyster journey data. This and other measures were analyzed before and 564 
after the introduction of “3 + 3” service. PPM increased substantially and OJT decreased (i.e. 565 
they both improved). EJT decreased by substantially more than OJT for the line as a whole and 566 
in fact increased for the core portion of the line, which was the portion towards which the “3 + 3” 567 
service was targeted. 568 
These discrepancies were found to be because the “3 + 3” timetable had lengthened 569 
running times over the whole line and shortened them over the core portion. This highlights the 570 
relative nature of EJT, illustrating its value as a relative rather than absolute measure. EJT 571 
provides good information about how the passenger experience compares to the timetable, but 572 
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not necessarily a clear picture of how it has changed in an absolute sense. It is thus similar to on-573 
time performance, but measured for and weighted by individual passenger journeys. 574 
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ABBREVIATION GLOSSARY 633 
AFC Automatic fare collection PPM Public performance measure 
CLJ Clapham Junction station RMD Richmond station 
CMD Camden Road station SJT Scheduled journey time 
EJT Excess journey time SRA Stratford station 
EWT Excess waiting time TfL Transport for London 
GOB Gospel Oak to Barking Line tph Trains per hour 
GPO Gospel Oak station WAT Watford DC Line 
LOROL London Overground Rail 
Operations Limited 
WIJ Willesden Junction station 
WLL West London Line 
NLL North London Line   
OJT Observed journey time   
OTP On-time performance   
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